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Autonomous vehicles bring the promise of enhancing the consumer’s experience in terms of comfort
and convenience and, in particular, the safety of the autonomous vehicle. Safety functions in au-
tonomous vehicles such as Automatic Emergency Braking and Lane Centering Assist rely on com-
putation, information sharing, and the timely actuation of the safety functions. One opportunity to
achieve robust autonomous vehicle safety is by enhancing the robustness of in-vehicle networking
architectures that support built-in resiliency mechanisms. Software Defined Networking (SDN) is
an advanced networking paradigm that allows fine-grained manipulation of routing tables and rout-
ing engines and the implementation of complex features such as failover, which is a mechanism of
protecting in-vehicle networks from failure, and in which a standby link automatically takes over
once the main link fails. In this paper, we leverage SDN network programmability features to en-
able resiliency in the autonomous vehicle realm. We demonstrate that a Software Defined In-Vehicle
Networking (SDIVN) does not add overhead compared to Legacy In-Vehicle Networks (LIVNs) un-
der non-failure conditions and we highlight its superiority in the case of a link failure and its timely
delivery of messages. We verify the proposed architectures benefits using a simulation environment
that we have developed and we validate our design choices through testing and simulations.
1 Introduction and Related Work
Safety is a key concern in the development of autonomous vehicles [7]. In fact, according to IBM
[8], autonomous cars by 2025 are expected to be equipped with self-healing mechanisms that enable
decreased human intervention and maintenance. Self-healing features such as network reconfiguration
in the case of a link failure are not natively supported in LIVNs [25]. Attempts to add support for
failover mechanisms in LIVNs such as the Controller Area Network (CAN) [16] will come with the
price of extra complexity and a hefty development cost. A damaged in-vehicle bus or Electronic Control
Unit (ECU) can cause functional exclusion and the consequences might be catastrophic when it comes
to safety-critical features.
Introducing complex features such as failover is a design and cost challenge: Car manufacturers tend
to introduce features that leverage existing components and design. This is not only a cost saving and risk
minimization approach, but also saves the manufacturers significant research and development cost and
time. With the advances in network technologies such as SDN and Time Triggered Ethernet (TTE), the
introduction of new designs that support complex features without changing the underlying LIVN ECUs
[21] [6] is now possible. The usual solution when existing LIVN buses cannot support new features is to
re-architect, which introduces new risk and cost throughout the product line engineering.
Resiliency in LIVNs has been the subject of research efforts from industry and academia. In [16],
Philips analyzed the different use cases associated with CAN bus failures and proposed Redundant Trans-
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Figure 1: Legacy in-vehicle networks (LIVN) architecture
mission Technique to overcome link or transceiver failure. This technique relies simply on the replication
of the ECU’s components as well as the CAN bus itself. This allows the CAN system to use a second
transceiver or bus if the first one fails. Applying the same technique to the other LIVNs such as LIN
(Local Interconnect Network: a single wire network mainly used for non-critical purposes such as body
control), Flex Ray (considered as the successor of the CAN bus as it handles more traffic and advanced
control features), or MOST(Media Oriented Systems Transport : an optical bus designed to carry info-
tainment traffic) will lead to an increase in cost, weight, and environmental impact, all of which steer
decision making in the automotive industry. Another study highlighted the risk associated with losing
parts or most of an in-vehicle bus[12]: The authors categorized the attacks on the in-vehicle bus as a
threat to the integrity and the availability of the vehicle’s features. A native threat to the resiliency of
LIVNs, especially the CAN bus, is its data transmission paradigm that relies on broadcasting data be-
tween components [25]. The fact that a CAN frame is received by all the ECUs constitutes a threat to
the in-vehicle bus since attackers need only access to one ECU to be able to eavesdrop on all the mes-
sages circulating in the bus or inject false messages that could change the behavior of the vehicle. TTE
represents a flavor of deterministic and real time Ethernet technologies. It was tested and proved a viable
solution for automotive [22] and aeronautics [15] applications. TTE switches also supports fault toler-
ance [18], which makes it a perfect candidate for future autonomous vehicle’s network backbone. SDN
is a networking paradigm that leverages separation of control and data plane and network programma-
bility to enable complex features such as fine grained forwarding [4], QoS [24], load balancing [2], and
failover [1].
As opposed to the LIVN architecture described in Fig. 1, the architecture we propose enables Fast
Failover [1] in the case of a link failure and message delivery in a timely manner regardless of data fre-
quency or refresh rate, this will solve the lack of failover support by LIVNs. Our design has also the
added benefit of leveraging unicast communications instead of broadcasts, reducing the risk of eaves-
dropping on automotive components [12]. Our contribution features SDN as an overlay on top of the
CAN bus and the other LIVNs. This overlay will enable complex features that can stimulate innovation
and help realize IBM’s 2025 self-healing car vision.
In this work, we propose a SDIVN (defined above) with support of Fast Failover to enable au-
tonomous vehicles self-healing in the case of a link failure. This design can scale to support more links
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Figure 3: Software Defined In-Vehicle Network design and the journey of a CAN ECU message
and ECUs, which will improve resilience, sustainability and interoperability. We discuss our contri-
butions as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the elements of the design we propose, in Section 3 we
leverage the design elements to build a simulation environment for validation. In Section 4, we stress the
simulation environment through experimentation, results generation, and results discussion. Finally, we
summarize the work we have done in this paper and we highlight current and future work in Section 5.
2 SDIVN Design Elements
In this section we present the SDIVN design that enables the implementation of advanced features within
an automotive network. This design not only assures safety mechanisms but also interoperability between
different ECU protocols and features. In this work we focus on the safety mechanisms and we leave
the interoperability aspect for a future work. The SDIVN is composed of the following components:
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) generate and receive data from off/on-board sensor arrays or from
other ECUs. These ECUs are IP capable thanks to the universal adapters described in Fig. 2 that enable
the communication across the SDN backbone by re-packing LIVN messages (such as CAN messages)
to an Ethernet frames and vice-versa. These ECUs are connected to a TTE Backbone through Open
Flow capable switches [13]. The choice of TTE as a backbone is due to the fact that it outperforms
industrial automotive technologies such as Flex Ray [21] in terms of real time requirements, flexibility,
and resiliency. The Open Flow switches are connected to the SDN controller which also runs additional
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Figure 4: Fast Failover Group Elements
applications related to, for example, resiliency [20], load balancing [2], QoS [26], security [5], etc.
The process of generating data by an ECU includes re-packing it into an Ethernet frame by the
adapter, processing it through the SDN backbone, subjecting it to the Open Flow rules within SDN
switches, and delivering it to the destination ECUs. This process is described in Fig. 3.
The final element in our design is the Fast Failover application that runs in the SDN controller. Fast
Failover [1] is a feature that allows link reconfiguration in the case of a port failure. This feature leverages
Open Flow 1.3 Groups to enable port state monitoring and action upon port status change, using watch
ports and action buckets. The SDN application that runs at the SDN controller populates SDN switches
with flow tables and rules that help the network recover from link failure. Rules include Fast Failover
Groups that implement mechanisms of path switching if a link is down. Fig. 4 is an illustration of
Fast Failover Group components, the components of relevance are the buckets that contain a port status
monitoring watch port; If the latter fails packets are processed according to actions defined in the bucket
actions and are eventually sent to backup paths. More details about the dynamics of Fast Failover are
explained in [14]. Tests have been run to assess this feature and results show that the time to recover is
in the order of microseconds which is acceptable for the applications we intend to test.
3 Design Validation
In this section, we describe the resiliency validation design for both SDIVN and LIVN. An obstacle
detection use case is leveraged to highlight how each design operates regarding the resiliency feature.
Obstacle detection in autonomous cars is a key stone property that requires reliable and complete
perception of the environment of the vehicle in order to avoid high risk situations. Numerous works have
investigated obstacle detection techniques and requirements in autonomous vehicles: In [17] the authors
analyzed sonar image data properties in autonomous underwater vehicles and introduced a special sonar
data compression technique that optimizes the obstacle avoidance process and enhances sonar data inter-
pretation. In [3] the authors presented a survey on obstacle detection techniques that are based on stereo
vision or 2D/3D technologies. For our work, we are rather interested in preserving critical functions such
as obstacle detection during a bus failure by leveraging the SDIVN network programmability capability.
For the SDIVN and LIVN the components behavior is described in Fig. 5 as follows: CAN1 ECU
and CAN3 ECU generate different CAN messages with different frequencies, each message represents a
specific automotive function. For illustration purposes, CAN3 represents a special hardware that detects
obstacles in front of the car and sends messages to the Antilock Braking system (ABS) located at CAN4
at a high refresh rate of 1 message per 50 ms. The ABS system ensures the vehicle’s stopping based
on road conditions and information that comes from the obstacle detection ECU located at CAN3 ECU.
CAN1 represents a sensor that measures the road condition and sends messages to an alarm system
52 Robust Safety for Autonomous Vehicles through Reconfigurable Networking
Open Flow 
SW1
Open Flow
SW2
Open Flow
SW4
Open Flow
SW3
SDN‐Controller
Fast Failover 
Application 
PATH1
PATH2
s1p1
s1p2 s1p4
s1p3 s3p3
s3p4 s3p2
s3p1
s2p1 s2p2
s4p1 s4p2
e1p0
e3p0
e2p0
e4p0
10.0.0.1
10.0.0.3
10.0.0.2
CAN1
A
d a
p t
e r
CAN3
A
d a
p t
e r
CAN2
A
d a
p t
e r
10.0.0.4
CAN4
A
d a
p t
e r
Ports Labeling 
eipj [ei: ECU id      ,  pj: ECU port id    ]
sxpy [sx: Switch id ,  py:Switch port id]
Figure 5: ECUs exchange in-vehicle messages and leverage the SDIVN
located at CAN2 ECU at a low refresh rate of a 1 message per 100ms. Frequencies used here may be
different for different applications, they are used here for illustrating the use of SDIVN. We want to
verify that under normal conditions (no link failure) the design guarantees data delivery and also ensures
the integrity of the signals frequencies at the receiving ECUs. We also want to establish the benefit of
the Fast Failover mechanism when a link fails.
3.1 SDIVN
We validate the proposed Software Defined In-Vehicle Network for link failover by the implementation
of the different components described in the previous section and running a simulation of the proposed
design. Fig. 5 illustrates the validation use case for the SDIVN.
We are aware that the size and design of the SDIVN in Fig. 5 is not representative of the wide
spectrum of possible sizes and architectures. We are reducing the scope in purpose in order to make a
proof of concept for the resiliency property.
We care about the integrity of the message frequency because as we approach an obstacle, if the
frequency is altered at the reception, the detection or the expected actuation process might take longer
than it should, and appropriate reaction to it in a timely manner might not be possible.
We have implemented the simulation environment using Mininet 2.2.1 installed on a patched Linux
Kernel (4.11.0-rc8+) that supports CAN-Utils Package namespaces [14]. Additionally, we have built the
protocol adapters based on TCP/IP Sockets (that ensure retransmission in the case of a packet loss) and
CAN-Sockets [23]. For the SDN implementation, Floodlight [19] is our choice for the controller as it
supports the implementation of Fast Failover. A representation of the software stack we have leveraged
is described in Fig. 6
After running the simulation, the SDN controller populates the flow and group tables with necessary
rules and actions to handle link failover Fig. 7 is a non-exhaustive perspective on the group table and
flow table rules installed after running the application. The hosts are discoverable using the learning
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Figure 6: Developed and Open-Source components used in the validation experiment
Table SRC DST Instructions
0 Port1 or Port2 Port3 or Port4 Goto Group1
0 Port3 or Port4 ECU1 or ECU3 Forward to corresponding host
Flow Table 0 for SW1
Group ID Group Type Action Bucket
1
Fast 
Failover
If 3 is down 4 is up
If 4 is down 3 is up
Flow Table 0 for SW3
Table SRC DST Instructions
0 Port1 or Port2 Port3 or Port4 Goto Group1
0 Port3 or Port4 ECU2 or ECU4 Forward to corresponding  ECU
Group 1 for SW1 Group1 for SW3
Group ID Group Type Action Bucket
1
Fast 
Failover
If 3 is down 4 is up
If 4 is down 3 is up
Figure 7: Open Flow tables and Group tables after the SDN controller runs the Fast Failover application
switch application that runs in the beginning of the process. The fast failover application operates as
follows: One path can be used at a time, if PATH1 is enabled, PATH2 ports are disabled and vice versa,
and ports from different paths can’t be enabled at the same time. If there is a port failure on one path, the
Fast Forwarding application disables ALL ports on that path and switches to another path (see Fig. 5 for
illustration).The code for the application we have used for this setup is available in [10].
3.2 LIVN
For the CAN bus simulation, we have adopted the design in Fig. 8. This design can’t support multiple
paths for failover as the CAN bus is a broadcast medium and adding extra links to it will result in
broadcast storms, resulting in replicate messages in the beginning of the data transfer, and a complete
outage of the bus after few seconds. These are some of the limitations of the CAN bus.
4 Results Discussion
In this section we show the benefit of the Fast Failover resiliency mechanism in the SDIVN design we
have proposed, and we estimate the Average Failover Cost per packet which will inform us about whether
or not the impact of the Fast Failover mechanism is significant.
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Figure 8: ECUs exchange CAN messages and leverage a broadcast medium to simulate a CAN bus
4.1 Results outcome for SDIVN and LIVN
We have run experiments described in the previous section for 60 seconds, and we simulate a link failure
at t=30 seconds. Heuristic experiments show that the transition from one failed path to an up and running
path in the case of SDIVN is almost instantaneous which is illustrated in Fig. 9. The figure shows how
the SDIVN design we proposed preserved the function and its properties while the LIVN didn’t. SDIVN
allows the network to quickly recover from link failure and preserves message delivery and frequency.
Another benefit of the SDIVN is its unicast nature, messages are sent to their specific destinations based
on rules generated by the application running in the SDN controller, reducing the risk of bus outage or
the replicate message caused by broadcasts. In the same figure we see that the LIVN is incapable of
recovering from a link failure as it does not support resiliency mechanisms.
4.2 Timing Analysis
The main focus of this subsection is to estimate the delay cost of the Fast Failover mechanism. For this
end, we describe the timing parameters that are involved when a packet is processed through the pro-
posed SDIVN.
We define the total propagation delay Tpd as the sum of the propagation delays of the N links P(i)
connecting sending and receiving endpoints.
Tpd =
N
∑
i=1
P(i) (1)
We define the Transfer Time Tp for 1 packet from a sender to a receiver as the difference in time
between the reception time Tr of the packet at the receiving ECU and the sending time Ts at the generating
ECU, as expressed in (2).
Tp = Tr−Ts (2)
Tp can also be expressed as follows (3)
Tp = Tpd +EDd +Fd +Cd +FOd (3)
Where Tpd is the total propagation delay along the path between the two ECUs, EDd is the time it
takes to encapsulate and decapsulate the packet at the adapter, Fd is the forwarding time at the Open Flow
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Figure 9: Fast Failover results in both cases: SDIVN instantly switches to PATH2 when PATH1 fails.
LIVN fails to maintain function since it does not have failover mechanisms
switches, Cd is the processing time at the SDN controller, and FOd is the failover time in the case of a
link failure
The encapsulation time and decapsulation time EDd is the time it takes the universal adapter at the
ECU’s edge to Encapsulate Ed and Decapsulate Dd the packet as expressed in (4)
EDd = Ed +Dd . (4)
The failover time FOd is the time it takes the system to detect failure DFd , reconfigure the network
RNd , and retransmit the packet RPd if it was lost during failure, as expressed in (5)
FOd = DFd +RNd +RPd (5)
We define the Transfer Time for all packets T Td as the sum of the Transfer Time of all received
packets Tp(i). K is the total number of received packets, as expressed in (6)
T Td =
K
∑
i=1
Tp(i) (6)
We define the average packet transfer time ATT as follows (7)
AT T = T Td/K. (7)
Under normal conditions (no link failure), AT T = AT T Np, and if a link failure occurs during the
transmission process, AT T =AT T Fp. The relationship between AT T Fp and AT T Np is expressed in (8)
AFCPp = AT T Fp−AT T Np (8)
For a single link failover we calculate the Average Failover Cost Per Packet AFCPp for both re-
fresh rates (50 ms and 100 ms). We can express AFCPp as the difference in time between the Average
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Refresh Rate = 50ms Refresh Rate = 100ms
ATTFp 50.404777 ms 50.337497 ms
ATTNp 50.403160 ms 50.336002 ms
Figure 10: AT T Np and AT T Fp for both frequencies.
Packet Transfer Time during normal conditions AT T Np and the Average Packet Transfer Time during
link failover AT T Fp. This calculation will give us insights on whether or not Fast Failover has a negative
impact on the functionality.
We calculate the AFCPp based on the AT T Fp and AT T Np values we have measured and logged in
Fig. 10
AFCPp[50 ms] = AT T F p - AT T N p = 1.617 us = 0.00320% of the AT T N p[50 ms].
AFCPp[100 ms] = AT T F p - AT T N p = 1.495 us = 0.00297% of the AT T N p[100 ms].
4.3 Summary of Results
The Average Failover Cost Per Packet AFCPp value in both cases (50 ms and 100 ms refresh rate) is
negligible compared to the average transfer time per packet AT T N. We conclude that the Fast Failover
mechanism does not cause a significant delay overhead when a link failure occurs in this example. How-
ever, it guarantees timely message delivery and message frequency integrity.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we presented a new design for in-vehicle networks that allows recovery from link failure
by leveraging the network programmability provided by SDN. Since automotive networks are size de-
termined, engineers could use SDIVN to design failover paths for a functionality that they judge to be
critical. We have demonstrated through simulation that this mechanism is so efficient that the time to re-
cover is insignificant for the frequencies and network size we have tested, and we believe that the positive
results perceived during experiments we ran will hold for larger networks. In-Vehicle network compo-
nents and links will continue to evolve in terms of hardware performance and software optimisation to
accomodate the bandwidth and delay requirements.
For Future work, we are exploring other interesting areas such as the impact of interoperability
between different ECUs. We believe that interoperability between heterogeneous data sources within an
SDIVN will stimulate the innovation of a new spectrum of advanced autonomous vehicle features. We are
also conducting a statistical analysis based on the fractional factorial design [9], the goal is to understand
which parameters (network size, bus speed, bus degradation, bus delay ...) have the most influence on
certain autonomous vehicle properties of interest(resiliency, interoperability, scalability ...). Another
area of interest is Software Defined Wireless In-Vehicle Networks (SDWIVN), for which we built a
testbed and conducted promising experiments [11], such design choice has the potential of bringing
novel contributions to energy saving techniques and environmental impact improvement.
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